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As is shown by the below exchange between rwo journalists speakingon Swiss public radio, suspicions of corruption within the FédérationInternationale de Football Association (FIFA) were rife even before theoFIFAgate"
scandal broke ar the endof May 2015
Christian Faure, journallst & radio news presenter: "To concludz, doesBkter, As ue are ofien told, does he run bis FIFA honestly or not?"
Robert, joumalist & head of the sports desk: "Well, lou hnou, he runsb honestly because tltne haue been legalproceedings, but Blatter and FIFA
neuer been caught out. Tbere are still proceedings undn utay. I tellyou
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that Blnner will be re-elected uery cornfortably. He will heep going. He has
been at FIFA for 30 yeart president since '98, but, clearly, if a corruption
0r some otber sort of scandal breahs, well, in that case, Blaner will fall fom
his throne. But, at the moment, he is solidly seated on that throne." (Radio
Suisse Romande, Forum,28 August 2014).
In fact, Sepp Blatter's term as FIFA president had been dogged by
allegations of corruption, most of which Blatter had skilfully man-
aged to contain or smother. As a result, FIFA during the "Blatter eri'
had been seen as a pioneering sport federation whose management
principles and methods provided a "strategic model" for all Olympic
organisations.
The following analyses draw heavily on research carried out for a
sport science doctoral thesis entitl ed " The modalities of gouernance in
internati.onal non-proft organisations: the case of international sporting
federations" (Arcioni 2007), which examined three sport federations,
including FIFA. This thesis used observations, internal and externai
FIFA documents (activity reports, financial reports, studies/surveys of
football and FIFA), and interviews with senior managers, including
Sepp Blatter (conducted between 2002 and 2006) to provide a quali-
tative analysis of FIFAs management methods. Additional and more
recent data were obtained from an interview with Blatter, carried out
on October 16, 2013 at FIFAS headquarters in Zurich; meetings with
Nicolas Maingot, FIFAs Deputy Director of Communication and
Public Affairs; press articles about Blatter's career and presidency; inter-
nal FiFA documents (activity reports, financial reports, etc.) provided
by FIFA; and an scholarly review of FiFAgate and Blatter's fall (Bayle
and Rayner 2016).
The present review of Blatter's career covers the period from 1975,
when he first joined FIFA, to the eruption of the FIFAgate scandal in
2015. Our analysis is divided into three main sections covering Blatter's
rise through the ranks of football administration, the management
principles underlying what can be called the "Blatter system", and the
events that led to FIFAgate and the collapse of this system. \7e con-
clude by examining the legacy Blatter has left for FIFA and for sport in
general.
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Sepp Blatter's Career
Joseph S. Blatter was born on March IO, 793,6 in Visp, a small town
in the Valais canton of Switzerland. He completed his primary and
secondary education at Catholic schools in Sion and St-Maurice
before going on to study economics and business administration at the
University of Lausanne. He was passionate about football from a very
young age and played comperirively from 1948 until 1971, ending his
playing career in Switzerland's amateur football league. The hotel trade
was another of his youthful interests, so he spenr many of his holidays
working in resorts such as Saas-Fee, Zermatt and Locarno, where he
became fluent in French, English, Italian and Spanish, as well as his
native German.
Although he had hoped to follow a career in journalism-he had
joined the Association of Swiss Sports Journalists in 1956-when he
graduated from university he accepted a position as head of public rela-
dons for the Valais tourist board. His first opportunity to work in sport
came in 1964,when he was appoinred general secrerary of the Swiss lce
Hockey Federation, but by the early 1970s he had decided he wanted
to go back to public relations. As a result, he moved to the private sec-
tor, joining the Swiss watch manufacrurer Longines S.A. as Director of
Sports Tming and Public Relations. It was this role that gave him his
first experience of the workings of international sporr, as Longines was
ùe official timekeeper for the 1972 and 1976 Olympic Games.
Despite his busy professional life, Blatter continued to make time
for football, first doing voluntary work organising referees for a local
football club and then, from 1970 to 1975, serving as an execurive
with Swiss first division club Neuchâtel Xamax FC. In the summer
of 1975 FIFAs president, Joâo Havelange, asked Blatter to become
the federation's new development director and the rwo men quickly
became lifelong allies. Blatter, who had already seen the porenriai for
creedng new competitions and for using football as an educational tool,
began setting â course that would lead to the creation of \forld Cups
for \fomen (Senior, u-20 and U-I7) and to the development of futsal,
all of which have become very important parts of FIFAs activities.
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Blatter gradually rose through the FIFA hierarchy, becoming secre-
tary general in 1981 and chief executive officer (CEO) in 1990. Finally,
in June 1998, he was elected president, a position he would hold until
December 2015. Blatter's decision to stand for election as FIFA presi-
dent, taken at the end of March 1998, was partly prompted by the
encouragement he had received from national associations throughout
the world, especially those outside Europe. He owed this support to a
number of factors, including his charisma, his relations with national
association executives and his thorough knowledge of all the issues fac-
ing FIFA. In addition, one of his election pledges was to redistribute
FIFAs revenues more equitably, with each member-association being
promised US$1 million per quadrennial cycle. Redistributing FIFAS
revenues in this way wâs intended to help national federations in devel-
oping countries, most notably in the southern hemisphere, implement
their own and FIFAs development programmes, but it was also a way
for Blatter to consolidate his po\Mer by gaining the support of poorer
footbdling nations. Blatter's popularity with the non-European member-
associations also ensured him the backing of FIFAs outgoing president,
Joâo Havelange. Consequently, at FIFAs 51st Ordinary Congress in
Paris, Blatter was elected to the most porverful position in internationd
football, beating his rival Lennart Johansson by 1i 1 yotes to 80. Blatterk
rise was unique in the world of sport federations, as never before had a
major international federation elected a president from the ranks of its
salaried staff. Previously, all sport federation presidents had been chosen
from among the federationt board and on the basis of highly political
criteria. A year later, on 20 June 1999, at the International Olympic
Committee's (IOC) 109th Session in Seoul, Sepp Blatteç who wes seen
as one of the most talented and experienced leaders in internationd
sport,l wâs co-opted as the IOC's 104th member. That same year Blamer
was named es one of the IOCt representatives on the Foundation Board
of the newly formed W'orld Anti-Doping Agency (\7ADA).
Blatter had a wide-ranging vision of how football should develop and
how FIFA could contribute to this development. Hence, he launched
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numerous projects that would consolidate and increase FIFAs infu-
ence and allow football to evolve in response to changes in both sport
and society. An important part of his stratery \Mas ro increase women's
involvement in all areas of football, from the pitch (players, maneg-
ers, referees) to the boardroom (clubs, Ieagues, national associations).
He also wanted to cultivate closer relations with FIF,{S economic and
political parrners, and to enhance football's socio-cultural impact within
local communities. He realised the importance of effectivù commu-
nicating FIFA' message through all possible channels, including televi-
sion, Internet and the new mobile media. In this respect, one of Blatter's
first priorities after his election was to negotiate more advantageous tele-
vision and marketing contrecrs for FIFA \forld Cups.
He also took a number of concrete measures to increase the audience
for football. For example, he creared several new FIFA competidons,
including the Club \?'orld Cup (new format),'Women's lJ-20 andlJ-L7
\7orld Cups, and the Beach Soccer \7orld Cup. Another major pro-
ject was to build a new headquarters for FIFA in Zwich, which would
enable the federation to concentrate all its expanding operations in one
building. The first stone for the building, on rhe newly renamed FIFA-
Suasse (formerly AdolÊJôhr-Veg), was laid on 14 May 2OO4 as part
of the celebrations for FIFAs 100th anniversary. Designed to project
a strong image of FIFA as one of the world's richest and most po\Mer-
firl sport federations, the new "Home of FIFA" was delivered rwo years
later, on April 28, 2006.2
Thanks to the experience acquired ecross the differenr sectors of
global football, FIF,{s president appeared to have the foresight and
know-how needed to overcome all the chdlenges facing football and
modern sporr, so it is perhaps unsurprising that he had his preside5r-
tial mandate renewed three times, beating his opponents by very wide
margins in 2002 and 2011 and being re-elected unopposed in 2007.
During his long service as a FIFA executive he helped oversee rhe
2tcfficial inauguration: 29 Mry 2o07, on the eve of the 57 FIFA congress. Facts and 6gures:
total cost-cHF240 million, size of the main building-lengh: 134 metres, width:41 mletres,
heighr 12 metres. For more details, go to hmp:i/fr.fifarcomiùomfifa/federation/insidefifainews/
ne'wsid=52875 9.html#bienvenue+nouveau+home+fi fa.rsource' \Talter Gagg, FIFAs Director of Stadiums and Security, interviewed in 2005.
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staging of nine 'W'orld Cups (Spain 1982, Mexico 1986, Italy 1990,
V{n tggq, France 1998, South Korea{apan 2002,3 Germany 2006,
South Africa 2070 and Brazil 2074) and made numerous contributions
to modifying the laws of the game, improving refereeing and developing
football in general.
For Sepp Blatter, football is a school of life, the perfect team sPort'
as it combines "education, personality and a fighting spirit in mutual
respect and discipline".4 Blatter believed in football as a wây of pro-
moting mutual understanding between peoples in a spirit of fair play.
"Football for all and all for football" sums up his credo. He felt that
"Football is a stage and a football show can âttrâct the media like no
other sport. It can inspire artists and create numerous jobs. Howeveç
football is first a synonym for passion and emotion. It can both kindle
and move. It is the most populâr geme in the world, a popular topic of
conversation".S Football's importance in the world of sport was clearly
demonstrated at the opening ceremony for the 2014 Sochi Olympics,
when Blatter stole the thunder of both IOC President Thomas Bach
and Russian President Vladimir Putin simply by announcing that he
would accept another term as FIFA president if asked to do so.
The "Blatter System"
A succession of measures introduced during Blatter's time at FIFA, first
under Joâo Havelange and then during his own presidency, pro-
foundly changed the way FIFA was governed. These measures, many of
which were taken in response to Pressure from the media and FIFAs
stakeholders following scandals prior to FIFAgate' produced a sys-
tem of governance that was more akin to the management structures
adopted by multinationals than to the sport governance model laid out
in Àe "IOC 2000" report. Hence, the way FIFAs governânce evolved
3South Korea ancl Japan entered a joint bid to stage the event after initially entering individual
bids, By the time of the vote, there were no other candidates to host the event'
4Sour.e, Sepp Blatter, interviewed on 16 October 2013 inZuridt.
5Source: http://fr.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/president/aboutpresident.html.
is best understood in the light of theories of corporare governance. This
evolution produced what we call the "Blarter system", which included
a number of innovative management principles and methods for the
international sport sector.
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Framework for Studying FIFAs Governance During
the Blatter Era
The following analysis of how FIFAs governance evolved during the
Blatter era is based on the governance framework described by Perez
(2003), which brought a new dimension to the analysis of organisa-
tional governance. Perez's breakthrough was to consider governance at
the systemic level (i.e., how an organisationt governance responds to its
external environment) as well as the organisational level (i.e., day-to-day
management and internal procedures and safeguards). Table I2.l shows
the five levels of corporate governance described by Perez and the differ-
ent dimensions of each level proposed by Arcioni.
Applied to FIFA, the first level of governance can be used to assess
how well the federation is managed with respect to its financial strength
a.nd the efficacy of its management, etc. The four dimensions of the sec-
ond level provide insight into the composition and strength of power
within the federation, whereas the third level examines the internal
controls FIFA has put in place to prevent abuses of this power. Level
four covers FiFAs relations with its stakeholders, both within and out-
side the Olympic/sports system, while the metagovernance level touches
upon the issue of sustainable gro\À/th (societal dimension) and FIFAs
position within the wider social environment.
From his earliest days as FIFAs development director, Blatter's ob.iec-
tive was to ensure FIFA continued to grow into one of the world's
largest and most powerful spoft federations. The following paragraphs
present the measures FIFA has taken, often at the insdgation of Blatter,
with respect to each level in Perez's governance model and the impact
these measures have had on FIFAs development. The success of the
resulting governance system can be attributed laryely to the innovative
management principles and methods Blatter introduced.
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Table 12.1 Perezt five levels of governance,a as revised by Arcionib
Level 1
Management: day-to-day management of the organisation,s operations
Dimensions:
. Professionalism
. lndependence of funding
o Management
Level 2
Governance; "management of management" by bodies within the organisation(statutes, board of directors, general assembly, etc.)
Dimensions:
. ldentity
. Values
. Flexibility
. Configuration of internal power
Level 3
Regulation: "management of governance" by specific schemes (professional bodies,
adm in istrâtive authorities-{edicated authorities, judicial authorities)
Dimensions:
. Controls
. Communication
. lmputability
Level 4
Harmonisation: of regulation systems: ,.governance of governance,'(ensuring the organisation is run in harmony with its immediate environment,
e.9., within the overall sport system)
Dimensions:
. Stakeholder relations
. Reputation
. Judicial
Level 5
Metagovernance: the wider framework in which organisations carry out their
actions. including the need to comply with internalional legislation
Dimensions:
. Metajudicial
. Social and economic
. Conservation and management of resources for development purposes
. Reinforcement of the main social groups
. lmplementation means
aPerez, R. (2003), La gouvernance de I'entrep'se. paris: Ed. La DécouvertebArcioni, s. (2007). The Governance Modes of lnternational Non-profit
organisations: The case of 3 lnternational sporting Federations. Doctoral thesis,
université claude Bernard Lyon 1, France, and a report by Arcioni describing a
governance assessment system based on 5 levels of governance and 1g dimen-
sions/indicators that correlate with the loc's "univerial Basic principles of Good
Governance of the Olympic and Sporting Movement,'
Managerial Policy Relative to Structuring
and Development
Level 1: Management
Level 1 in Perez's model of governance co.,,ers the operational tools on
which FIFAs corporare governance is based. These tools include profes-
sionalism, funding, independence, menagement performance anJ disci-
plinary procedures.
rn 1975 Joâo Havelange recruited Sepp Blatter as FIFAs new develop-
ment direcror with the remit of maximising football's economic potential
in order to obtain rhe revenues needed to fund the sport's and the feder-
ation's future growth (see chaprer on Havelange). The revenue generarion
poliry Blatter introduced (sugden and Tomlinson 1998), with support
from Adidas chairman Horst Dassler, involved forming alliances b.deen
FIFA and major multinational companies such as coca-cola. As a resulr,
subsequent'w'orld cups have been sponsored by some of the worldt larg-
est trands, which pay considerable sums of money to display their logos
within venues and benefit from the exposure provided by global TV cov-
erage of the event. Blatter's new vision of sport as a vehicle for advertis-
ing grew out of his eadier experience in public relations for private-sector
companies (Bourg and Goudet 2012).In addition, Blatter copyrighted
FIFAs logo at the beginning of the 1980s, thereby allowing tlre fedeàion
to develop avery successful series of merchandising products.
. 
Blattert experience in marketing and the hotel industry also helped
him create a close-knit nemrork with marketing comparri.r, 
-,rltirr"-tionals, the media and sport organisations. coca-cola's sponsorship in
1976 (approx. us$5 million) provided the finance he needed to fund
his world development programme and create e new, bi-annual junior
world championship, the first edition of which was held in Tirnisia in
1977. 
,-Ihis competition was larer divided into two seperere competi-
tions for u-17s and u-20s, which attracted the electronics firm JVb as
â new sponsor in 1987.
Blatter understood the imponance of media coverage, especially
television colrerage, in levering new sponsorship contracts. FrÀ a television
perspecdve, football is a "product" \n/ith numerous assets, es it guarantees
a spectade within a set time frame and within a fixed field of play that is
easy to cover by cameras. In addition, foorball appeals ro sponsors because
it offers "emotiori' in the run up to the match, "passiori' during ùe
90 minutes of play and "dramd' during stoppege time. It cân even become
"uagedy'' in the cese of penalry shoot-outs. Blatter's idea was to offer tel-
evision channels and muldnational companies rrue parmerships based on
the emotion elicited by football,6 rather than "dassic" sponsorship deals in
which the sponsor pels to place a brand name on a jersry or a hoarding
etc. This innovative approach enabled FIFA to âtrrâcr several ne\\i spon-
sors,7 including Fujifilm (1936), Philips (198O and McDonald's (1994).8
Football's continentâl confederations and the world's largest clubs9 soon
began following FIFAs lead, and t}ereby increased their popularity dramat-
ically, year after yet, both within and beyond their borders. Consequendy,
by the mid-1980s, the world of football was enjoying a dramatic rise in im
revenues, æ income from sponsorship, merchandising and, later, broadcast-
ing rights replaced ticket sdes as the main sources of income. This infux
of wealth not only changed the management principles applied by sport
organisationslO and clubs,ll it also revolutionised the staging of compe-
titions,l2 as the easiest way to increase revenues from broadcasting rights,
sponsorship and merchandising was simply to increase the number of com-
petitions being played and the number of teams involved in these compe-
titions. This approach also appealed to the media, as it gave them a larger
supply of matches to cover.
6sudgen I. QOO2), "Network footbdl', lz Sudgen J., Tomlinson A. (dir.), Power games. A critical
so cio bg of sport, London, New York: Routeledge, 6 I 
-80.
TMichael L. Silk, David L. Andrews, C. L. Coie (2005). Sport andCorporate Nztionalism.Nett
York, USA: Berg.
sHerren A. (t994), gOeme anniaendire de k FIFA. 20 an fu prâidznce Joao Haaeknge: commen o-
ratiue book, op. cit., p. 87.
ePartnership between Manchester United and Vodaphone in 2000. See: Hamil S. (2008),
'Manchester United: the commercial development of a global footbail brand", iz Chadwick S.,
futhur D., International casa in the business ofsport, Ansterdam: Eisevier, 2008, pp. 114-134.
loBayle E., Chantelat P (2013), Lagouuernance d.es organisations sportiues,Pafis: Ed. fHarmattan.
llPierpoint B. (2000), "Heads above water: business strategies for a new football econom/,
Soccer & Society, vol. l, n" I, pp.29-38.
l2Holt M. (2007), "Global success in sport: the effective marketing and branding of the UEFA
Champions League', International Journal of Spo* Marhaing & Sponsorship, pp. 5141 .
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In 1993 Blatter began to address rhe issue of what he considered to
be the "bed" conrract FIFA had signed with the European Broadcasting
Union (EBU), which \Mas worth just CHF11 million (US$i1.5 million)
to FIFA in L982, increasing to around cHFi0 million (us$52 million)
in 1998.13 In 2002 he finally concluded a ne\il conrract under which a
single source broadcaster paid cHF500 million (us$521 million) for
all the TV and broadcasting rights ro the (men's) \7orld Cup. The new
deal was made possible by the liberalisation of the rules governing tel-
evision advertising (before, most counrries banned television channels
from'showing advertising hoardings in stadiums) and the gro.\À/th of pri-
vate television channels. Blattert efforts were helped by Horst Dassler,
who had set up a specialist sport evenr marketing company called ISL.
Like Blatter, Dassler had quickly realised that television channels would
be prepared to spend large sums of money in order to cash in on the
repidly increasing popularity of sport, especially when it ceme to the
largest evenrs, such as the FIFA'World Cup and Summer Olympic
Games. However, FIFAs close relations with ISL would lead to one of
the first scandals of Blatter's presidency when bankruprcy proceedings
against ISL revealed evidence of widespread corruption. ISLs demise
also led FIFA to take responsibility for negotiating its own broadcasting
rights contracts (Thble 12.2).
Revenues from TV rights and sponsorship, which amounted to
almost us$4 billion bervveen 2olr-zor4, \Mere key financial tools
for developing football. Moreover, FIFAs excellent financial health
(see Tâble 12.3) enabled the federation to respond to rhe growrh in irs
operations by increasing irs adminisrrâtive staff from 73 in l99B to over
400 at the end of 20L3. However, by 2002 Blatter was becoming con-
cerned about FIFAs image and the need to demonsrrare rransparency
and "good governance". As a result, he promoted tlrs Linsi, an expert in
banking goyernance and transparenry, from his position as FIFA fin"r..
director to the post ofsecretary general.
Although football originated in England, it has established roots
around the globe and has become one of the worldb most widely played
ÉEisenberg C., Mason T, Lanfranchi P, Sfâhl A. (2004), La FIFA, 1904-2004. Le sièclc dafiot-
ball, op. cit., p.248.
Table 12.2 Growth in revenues from TV rights and sponsorshi
Iime
periodâ
1974-1977 1978-1981 1990-1993
pfrom 19741o2014
1994-1997 2011-2014
2200
1 600
Number of national football federations
Number of clubs (thousands)
Number of international competitions
Number of registered players (millions)
Number of professional players (thousands)
Table 12.5 Changes in FIFA's administration
Key dates i n the Blatter era
Number of members on the Executive
Committee
Number of women on the Executive
Committee
Number of staff at FIFA's headquarters
Number of women (salaried) at FlFA,s
headquarters
6 27 26
9926 14,693
(1 e90)
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Table 12.4 Growth in global football during the Blatter era
Key dates in the Blatter era 1975 1981 1990 1998 2013
TV rightV
year in US$
millions
Marketing 1.3
in US$
millions
Number of
broadcast
hours
worldwide
during a
World Cup
year
142
103
2
1 1.6
42
150
149
3
27.1
53
209
301
16
38.3
1't0
166 198
30s
49
31
125
22
0
35
14
24 27
25,408
(1 ee8)
1990-1993 1994-
6s.7
1545
73,042
(2006)
1997 2011-2014
3800
200,000
during the Blatter era
1975
22
0
13
4
1981 1990 1998 2013
22
0 03
:l;
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çtt
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âKey dates in Blatter's career at FIFA: 1975, appointed FIFA development direc-tor; 1981. became secretary generar; 1990, named executive diiector (cEo);
1998, elected FIFA president
Table 12.3 FIFAs financial results from 1974 to 20,r4 (source FrFA Management
Report 2012)
contracts for FIFA before being "released" from his post ol,er the
underhand negotiating merhods he used ro ffy and sign a deal with
visa. Despite this scandal, Blatter appointed him secrelary general in
2^007-a clear sign that Blatter's main objective wâs ro maximise FIFn-s
financial and managerial performance.
Blatter's approach to developing women's football was ro ertrâct
sPonsors with product ranges aimed specifically at .women, such
Johnson and Johnson.l4 He also campaigned for increased med.ia cov-
erage of women's football ar rhe olympic Games. 'w'omen's foorball is
currendy experiencing a period of unprecedented growth, partly due
to the sums FIFA is spending on developing thislre" of rh. game,
either directly (e.g., in addition to funding for competitions, in 2012
us$3,195,000 was allocated to developirrg *o-.ri football), or via
the Financial Assistance Programme, whichllocates r5o/o of ii, b.rdget(US$37,500 per association, per year) to women's football.
73
32
20
8
400
157
FIFAs turnover in 5.6
U5$ millions
Financial results in 
-742
U5$ thousands
1974-1977 1978-1981
12.2
13
98.s
-2r00
sports. 's7hat is more, its appeal extends across the entire social spec-
trum. Despite the ways in which football has changed over rhe yeers,
a number of characteristics have remained rerativelf constanr, includ-
ing the g-ame's-abiliry_ ro etrract large crowds and to polarise feelings
between fans of rival clubs or nationJ reams (Tâbl e tZ.i).
- 
similarly, the 400 staff that make up FIFAS administration come
ftom 40 different nationalities and a wiâe range of social backgrounds(Tâble 12.5).
rn 2003 Blatter hired Jérôme valcke as Marketing Director. valcke
had started his career at French rv channel canal i b.for. becoming
cEo of Sporr + and sportfive. He used his experience and relationshipi
within the business world to sign 
" 
,r,r-b"i of lucrarive p*rr.rrlrlp
$ohnson & Johnson is an American pharmaceuticals company that was creared in 1gg6. h pro-
duces pharmaceutical and medical good., ."r. products 
"ni "o.-"tio, "rJlrJJ* ,aated ser-vices to consumers and health professionals.
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Level2t, Governance
Analysing the second level of governance provides insighr into an organ-
isationt identiry, values, abiliry to adapt and develop, and power con-
figuration (sovereignry role, composition and renewal of the Board of
Directors, composition of commissions and ad hoc committees, status
and function of the president andlor general manager). In the case of
FIFA, strategy is decided by the Executive Committee (executive body),
guided by the recommendadons of 22 standing committees, and imple-
mented by the General Secretariat (administrative body). Decisions on a
number of key issues, laid down in FIFAs srarures, have to be referred ro
the FIFA Congress (legislative body) for approval.
One of the Congress's most important functions is to elect FIFAs presi-
dent. Vice-presidents are elected by the continental confederations. Because
the president is also president of the Executive committee, the person occu-
pying this position has both execurive and operational powers, althou$
he15 must abide by the Congress's decisions. The Executive Commirree,
which meets four rimes a year, consists of 23 people nominated by the con-
tinenul confederations plus FIFAs president. As a first move rowards gender
equality, three women were appointed to the Executive Committee in20l3,
although only one of these women has voting rights. The presidenr musr
inform the Executive Committee about all imporrant maters and deci-
sions.l6 This committee (or, in some cases, the Emergency CommitteelT)
takes decisions relating to international issues and the ratification of recom-
mendations made by the standing committees. The Executive committee is
also responsible for appointing the secretary general.
The General Secretariat is divided into separate divisions responsible
for areas such as development, competitions, football administration,
finance, business, personnel services and communication. Directors
for these divisions, which employ a total of around 400 staff ar FIFAs
ITFIFA may have a womân president one day, but that day still appears very remore.
16Sepp Blatter, FIFA President.
lTThe Emergenry Committee deals with all business requiring settlement berween two sessions
of the Executive Committee. It is composed of FIFAs Presidànt and representatives from each
confederation, chosen among the members of the Executive Committee, who are appointed by
the Executive Committee for four years (http://fr.fifa.com/aboutfifa/organisation/boâies/excoan-
demergency/committee: 1 882020.htm1).
12 Sepp Blatter: Wielding Power Through F|FA 315
zuûch headquarters, are appointed by the President and the secrerary
general. The secrerary general is also responsible for finance, relation-
ships with member associations, and the staging of FIFA comperirions,
including the World Cup.
_ 
Despite this seeming separarion of strategic and operational powers
between the Executive Committee and secretariat, there is a degree of
overlap befween these two bodies. Hence, Blatter's system of governance
is presided by a CEO, as in the corporâre world.
FIFA currently has 209 member-associations, eech of which has one
vote within the congress. Because only 54 of these member associarions
are in Europe (and therefore members of UEFA18), FIF,{s president
must maintain good relations with national federations outside Europe
in order to hold onto and exercise his powerl9
Iævel3: Regulation
The third level of governance covers the internal controls and trans-
Perency mechanisms an organisation puts in place ro prevent abuses
of power, as well âs measures ro ensure the imputability of managers.
In response to a series of scandals that emerged during the 2000s, FIFA
introduced a number of new commissions to oversee its operations,
beginning with the financial control mechanism introduced in 2002
after ISL went bankrupt.2o
l:uEFAt power, especia.lly its financial power, is considerable. It distributes €600,000(us$713,000) to each of irs member assôciations evety yeaL considerably more than the
cH-F250,000 (us$260,000) distributed by FIFA. Moreover-, .ontr""t, with riv (formerly ISL)
forTV rights to UEFA matches are worth more than cHFr.4 billion (uS$i.5 billion).
l9Nationa.l football associations in southern hemisphere countries accounr for more than rwo-
rhirds ofthe votes at FIFA Congresses.
20lSL wæ created in 1983 by Horst Dassler in an attempr to monopolise the lucrative and rapidly
expanding market in television rights for major sport events. After very profitable beginnings, iSi-
became increasingly greedy and stàrted making some very rislçy intot-"À, paying e*I"ssireiy high
prices for a nurnber of events, including US$ L.2 biliion to cover nine major iennis-tournaments 6r
!p years' It also invested in Brazilian and Chinese football and CART racing in the United States.
Finally' ISL' in conjunction with Leo Kirch, paid almost US$750 million For rights to rhe 2002
and.2006 Foorball \7orld Cups. However, rhe 2002 event, held in South Korea aid;apan, proved
hard to sell to American and È,rropean networks due to match scheduling issues and che hig! cost.
The debts incurred by these poo, intest-ents led to ISL being declared Ëankrrrpt by a swiss court
in 2001. Part of the group was bought by one of ISL's main coirpetitors, the ræo'Kirch group.
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Another scandal arose in 2011, when Qatar was chosen to host
the 2022 \xôrld cup. Blatter's response was ro ser up an Independenr
commission for Governance and four working groups to address the
issues raised. FIFA also announced it was drawing up a road map for gov-
ernance reform, including proposals for changes to FIFAs Statutes. The
recommendations produced by these various commissions and task forces,
which were presented to the FIFA congress in 2073, resulted in numer-
ous reforms to FIF,{s oversight mechanisms and the introducdon of meæ-
ures to make the federation's decision-making processes more rransparenr:
c' Restructuring of the Ethics committee inro a two-chamber sysrem
with independent investigatory and adjudicatory chambers, each
with its own president and vice-president;
* Extension of the Audit Committee's powers ro create an Audit
and Compliance Committee with an independent presidenr and
vice-president;
" 
Adoption of a new Code of Ethics and a new code of Good
Behaviour;
,, Appointment of rhree women (one by election, rwo by co-optation)
to FIFAs Executive Committee;
" 
Selecdon by the Executive committee of no more than three bids to
host the FIFA \7orld Cup finals before a final choice is made by the
Congress, which can only award one edition of the '!7'orld Cup at
each session;
'o Introduction of a vetting procedure for all candidates standing
for election or re-election to the positions of president and vice-
president, and for prospective members of the Executive committee,
Audit and Compliance Committee or Ethics Committee, including
their presidents and vice-presidents;
"' Introduction of a sponsor sysrem for candidates for FIFAs presidency
in which each candidare musr be supported by at least 6ve member-
associations and have played an acrive role in hisiher football associa-
tion during the two to five years before presenting his/her candidacy.
,: Improved representation for football's main stakeholders;
" 
Redrafting of FIFAs Starutes in order ro more precisely define FIFAs
commitment to ethics and the fight against discrimination;
o Removal of the right of the four British football associarions to elect
1 jIFA vice-president. This vice-presidenr is now nominated byUEFA;
" Internarional Football Association Board (IFAB) to undertake its
own reform.
In order ro 
€nsure these reforms were implemenred fully and correctly,
FIFA contracted the inrernarionally respected auditors rprtac ro cârry
out external audits.
Level4: Hatmonisation
level 4 in Perezt governance model examines an organisation's rela-tionships with its immediate exrernal stakeholders. In À. case of FIFA,
these stakeholders are the sport movement, incruding the orympic sys-
tem, FIFAs commercial parrners and sponsors, and ih. g.rr.r"l p,rbir..
The mos-t important 
"rp..t of these rerationships is to 
""rrrur. 
" 
1"rg.
degree of harmony betw-een an organisationt practices and the expecta-
y:T- ot requiremenrs of its stakeholderr. Fo, .*"mple, in line with rheIoc's rules on recognising new nationar olympiË commitrees, FIFA
will only recognise new member-associarions'if they are the exclusive
body representing footbail for an enrire counffy, defined as an inde-
pendenl srare recognised by the internationar communiry. In addition,
a national association can only become a member of FIFA if it is already
a member of the relevant continental confederation. In anothe, .""-pl.
of harmonisation berween the interests of FIFA and the Ioc, when theIOC dropped its amateurism requirement for athletes taking p"r, ir, ,h.
olympics, FlFA_agreed to allowprofessional footballers ,o"r"k" part in
.lf-. 9]y*pi*. However, in order to prorecr the specificiry of the FIFAl7orld Cup, the IOC imposed li-iis o' the number of prof.rriorrrJ
players over the age of 23 Àat each team could field.
- 
Although FIFA has its own Ethics committee and code of
Ethics, adapted to the world of footbail, it recognises the authority
of two of the most important bodies in moderî sport, the court
of Arbitration for Spoit (cAs) and the \trADA, which Blatter
helped creare in 1999.2r Nevertheless, eny footballing disputes have ro
be referred to FIFAs own arbitrational bodies (Discipline commirtee,
Ethics Committee, Players' Sratus Committee, Dispute Resolution
Chamber and Board of Appeal) before being taken to the CAS22 and
Blatter came ro ân agreemenr with \7ADA president Dick pound
and iOC president Jacques Rogge that FIFA should have the right
to decide individual sanctions in doping câses, rarher than applying
automatic minimum penalties.23
Level 5: Metagovernance
The fifth level of governance concerns the wider framework in which
organisations carry out their acrions. Since Blatter arrived at FIFA, the
federation's objective has been ro grow football worldwide while using
the game as a tool for social development. In this respecr, FIFAs con-
tinued financial success has enabled it to carry out a wide range of
programmes with societal as well as sporting goals, such as its Goal
programme to develop football infrastructure, rhe Financial Assistance
Programme for member-associations and continental confederations,
and the Performance Programme to help professionalize the menage-
ment of member-associations.z4 A total budget of around US$800 mil-
lion was allocated to these programmes for the period 20Il-20I4,In
addition, FIFA has run numerous training courses for sports instruc
tors and sporrs educarors, especially in the sourhern hemisphere. Beach
soccer and futsal are two relatively recent products FIFA has used to
develop football by promoting different ways of pl"yrng and enjop
ing the game. Other elements of FIFAs srreregy ro increase interest in
2lFiFA hæ not ratified \rADAs founding treaql rather it reached an âgreemenr with WADA, in
2004 in Paris, that included FIFA's right to decide what sanctions to iÀpose on players. Source:
Marco Villiger.
22FIFA recognised rhe CAS in 2003 in Doha. Source: Marco Villiger.
23Following the arrival of the new 'WADA President, Jean-François Lamour, sepp Blatter became
a member of.!7r\DA.
24FIFA (2004). FIFA| globat re?\tt on the deuebpmmt offootball Zurich: FIFA. No 1 and FIFA
(2006). Actiuitl report 2006 presented dt the 56 FIFA coigot in Munich in 2006. Zurich: FIFA.
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playrng and watching football include "research and technical assis-
tance' programmes, developing female football, sponsoring research
into football medicine, and a social responsibiliry programme, launched
in conjunction with the United Nations and NGOs.
FIFA' buoyant income from television rights, which covers more
rhan 57o/o of the federation's budget,25 means that the federationt
finances are assured for the foreseeable future and that it does not have
!o- *ly on funding from the olympic revenues redistributed by theIoc. For example, FIFA earned us$2.4 billion26 from the 2010 \7orld
Cup, alone. Consequently, FIFA is able to provide financial support for
a wide range of football development projects as pan of its growth and
solidarity programme. In fact, the steady increase in FIFAs annual turn-
over during the Blatter era has enabled the federation to redistribute
everJarger sums to the continental confederations, member-associations
and development projects (Table 12.6).
lnnovative Management Principles and Methods
Although much of FiFAs rransformarion over the four decades berween
1975 and 2015 can be ascribed to Blatter's work during his terms as
development director, director general and presidenr, 
-,r.h of the credit
must also go to his predecessor as president, Joâo Havelange (president
kom 1974 to 1998). In fact, one of Havelanget firrt a"tior* after he
came to pov/er at FIFA \Mas ro appoint Blatter to help him develop and
implement his vision for the federation. Hence, Havelange, an inrer-
national lawyer by training, triggered the process and Blatter, with his
background in economics, public relations and club and federation
mânagemenr, implemented it.
Together, these rwo men seized the opportunities presented by an
evolving sporting and social environmenr, and turned FIFA irrto one of
21OC (2004). Re?ort on the I I7 IOC Congrets, Arhens, Lausanne: IOC.
6source: FIFA financial report 20i0: http://www.6fa.com/mm/document/affederation/adminis-
tntion I 0 | I 39 / 20 / 45 I w eb 
.frfa-f 12 0 I O_en g I I I . pdf.
J. ÀtLtqttt t! dl.
32O 5. Arcioni et al
Table 12.6 lncreases in FIFA's turnover and in the sums redistributed to FIFA's
members during the Blatter era (Source FIFA Management Report 2012)
1974-1977 1978-',t981 1990-1993 "t994-1997 2011-2014
FIFAs turnover in
US$ millions
Sums redistrib-
uted to the con-
federations in
US$ thousands
Sums redistrib-
uted to mem-
ber-associations
Sums allocated
to World Cup
teams in US$
millions
Sums allocated
to projects and
FIFA compe-
titions in U5$
millions
Sums allocâted to
football devel-
opment in U5$
millions
93 18,000 14,000 66,800
0.6 1.2 12.4 24 1860
1.4 2 21 18 800
aContinental confederations plus member-associations
the world's most prosperous sport organisations. This success wâs not,
however, due uniquely to their abiliry ro foresee the importance sport
would come to have in modern society; it was also the result of their
innovative approach to sport organisation development. For example,
they reaiised the value of having a yery powerful institutional image and
a strong brand for its flagship compedtion, the \7orld Cup. This ena-
bled them to marker football as a uniquely simple but captivating sport
that can be played anywhere in the world. In addition, they developed
football's appeai to sponsors by highlighting the emorions and passions
aroused by the game. Just as importantly, they understood that ticketing
to watch football could be expanded far beyond selling seats in a stadium
and that television rights could be negotiated at the silne rare as stadium
ticket prices multiplied by the number of potential television viewers.
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Expanding the audience for football, especially the television âudience,
allowed them to develop the idea of a business-sport-media partner-
ship in which the product-spectacle became rhe source of financial profit
for all the pertners involved: FIFA, sponsors and television companies.
Finally, the system they created also encompasses both new media, such
as the Internet, and football's grass roots stakeholders, including players,
fans and local adminisuators.
Blatter's stretegy for growing FIFA and world football also involved
forming partnerships with organisations such as UNiCER in which
football was used as a tool for development and education, especially
emong underprivileged sections of society and in emerging countries.
These programmes were a double success for FIFA as nor only did they
increase the number of people playi"g football and audiences for foot-
ball matches, t}rey created a positive image for the federation around the
world.27
fu FIFA grew, it could no longer be run effectively by the amateur
management sysrem it had relied on until the 1.970s. Blatter realised
this as soon âs he arrived at FIFA, so he quickly began reorganising
the federation's management along more professional lines. As a result,
FIFA is now run in a similar \ /ay to many commercial corporâtions. In
addition, Blatter proved to be very skilful in managing difficult situa-
tions, especially when it came to answering allegations of misconduct
within the press. Using his own approach to crisis mânagement, based
on knowledge, expertise, tru$ (in himself and in others), luck, instinct
and spontaneity,2s he was usually able to ensure any scandal frzzled out
within a few days. His ability ro emerge untainted from seemingly com-
promising situations was such that he continued to be showered with
awards for his work at FIFA throughout his career. However, neither
FIFAs professional mânâgement and commercial success, nor Blatter's
crisis management skills would be enough to save the system he had cre-
ated when rhe FIFAgate scandal broke.
2TSource: Sepp Blatter, interviewed on 16 October 2013 at FIFAs Zurich headquarters.
2$source: Sepp Blatter, interviewed on 16 October 2013 at FIFAs Zurich headquarters.
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FlFAgate and the Fall of the Blatter System
Masters of Crisis Management-How FIFA and Blatter
Overcame Scandal
FIFA officials have been accused of corruption on innumerable occe-
sions, often by investigative journalists, NGos or whistleblowers from
inside or close to FIFA. such allegations became far more frequent
during the final years of Joâo Havelange's long presidency (1974 to
1998)' and sepp Blatter's reign was dogged by repeated accusations of
wrongdoing by football's mosr senior execurives. Nevertheless, until
the FIFAgate scandal broke in 2015, Blatter always managed to isolate
FIFAs accusers and quickly smother any scandal.
In recent years, FIFA has attracted the attentions of a small num-
ber of very tenacious journalisrs, mosr notably the best-selling English
author David Yailop and the scottish journalist Andrew jennings,
who had earlier exposed numerous insrances of corruption within the
Ioc. Yallop set the ball rolling in 2002 with his book How They stob
tlte Game,i in which he suggested that Blatter was elected presijent of
FIFA (by 111 votes to 80) partly thanks to votes bought from African
representatives. These allegations were never proven and Blatter won a
legal batde ro prevent the book being published in switzerland. In 2006
Jennings, working for the BBC'' Panorama progremme, investigated
allegations of bribery in relation to the attribution of the \forld -cup.
This was the first of a series of documentaries and books about corrup-
tion within FIFIJi in which Jennings willingly rook on the role of pub-
lic accuser. In 2010 journalists from 7he Sunday Times, 
" 
,r.*rp"p.ithrt
had been in the front line of accusarions of doping in rycling, p"utirtt.d
compromising recordings obtained by presenting themselves to FIFA
officials as lobbyists for the USA' bid to host the \Zorld Cup. That
same yeer, south African journaiists associated with Jenningr p,rblirh.d
a bookfii lambasting FIFA for its predatory way of op.t"tirg, accusing
the federation of accumulating revenues and tax breaks while leaving all
expenditure to the host country. Another scandal arose in 2013 over the
attribution of the 2022world cup to Q"t"r, with both France Football,in January 2013, and Tbe Sunday Times, in June 2014, publishing
12 Sepp Blatter: Wielding power Through FIFA 323
*:qirtTr of corruption..Ihe Sunday Times, for example, claimed that
IIF,{. Qatari vice-president, Moharned Bin Hammam, had ensuredthe success of Qatar's \7orld cup bid by spending us$5 milion tobuy votes, mostly from the presiàents of 30 Africà federations. one
of FIFAs most influential represenratives, Jack \7arne! wes also impli-
cated. 'warner, a Ti'inidadian businessman, FIFA vice-president and
president of the confederation of North, central Âmerican and
caribbean Association Football (CONCACAF), was accused. of accept-
ing us$1.6 million from Bin Hammam. In April 2015 two sunday
Ïo*n^journalists published The ugly Gdme,iu a bristering accounr ofhow Qatar allegedly bought the votÀ'of FIFA' Executive c]ommittee.
FIFA has also been criticised by its own er<ecurives and mangers, espe-
cially in the run up ro or following presidential elections and"Executive
committee vores to choose 'world cup host countries. However, these
internal squabbles have had no real impact on FIFA, even when they are
picJ<ef up by the media. For example, i' ZOOO Germany *as ,rarrtwly
awarded the 2006 \forld c,tp (by 12 votes to 11) ahead of south Africa,
posibly thanla to the abstention of the oceania Football confederationb
president, charles Dempsey. one of rhe reasons Dempsey gave for his
subseqrrent resignation from the Executive commirtee ** â. pressure
he had been pur under not to vore for South Africa. rn 20o2 it was the
turn of_FIFA secretary general, Michel Zen-Ruffinen, to resign afrer not-
ing in his report "abuses of power" and Blatter's "dictatoà" manage-
ment. In May 2011 Mohamed Bin Hammam, Blatter's challenger fo.Ir.
FIFA presidency' wâs accused by coNCACAF's secretary g.rr.i"l, chuck
?!y: of attempting rf buy votes by distributing ."io!.r containing
us$40,000 to the heads of caribbean football 
"rro-.intionr, 
allegedly witË
the compliciry of Jack'Warner. Following, an internal 
"rrq.riryilFA r*_pended \7arner, who then accused Blatter of making a donatiln of us$ 1
million to his confederation. The accusation was q.rl.kf swept aside and
Bin Hammam withdrew from the presidential election, *"i.irrg Blatter
the only candidate.
In addition to these powff battles berween senior officials, other
accusations have come from whisdeblowers who have taken part in or
witnessed illicit transactions. For example, in December zot4 a for-
mer employee of the Q_atar bid confided to France Football that she had
witnessed bribes being paid by rhe e"t"t deregation. These allegations
,m/ere repeared in a documentary shown by German public television
channel ARD on 4 May 2015, which named thr.. Âfri""r, members
of FIFAs Executive committee who had been offered us$1.5 million
"encoufageTnents" by the Qatar delegation. Nevertheless, FIFA took no
action against either Qatar or the bribes' alleged recipients.
_ 
More seriously for FIFA, NGOs such as pafp, e009) and
Tiansparency Inrernetional (201r) have criticised the federation for
some of its practices and its lack of ffansparency. Because these criti-
cisms are made by independent and supposedly impartial bodies, FIFA
has to be seen to respond.
However, despite this litany of accusations, until 2015 FIFA always
managed to conrain potential scandals before they endangered the fed-
erariont stabiliry or its president's position. 'vThere possiblJ, FIFA would
silence critics by threatening legal action againsr ,ù- or, in the case of
FIFA staff, by pushing them to resign (Michel Zen-Ruffine n in 2002,
marketing director Guido Tognoni in 2003). critics from FIFAs mem-
ber-associations could also be discredited by expelling them from FIFA
or by taking disciplinary action against them. În these latter insrances,
the severiry of any sancdon would often depend on the political impor-
tance and power of the association in question. In other cases, FIFA
was forced to show that it was treating the accusations seriously and
taking meesures to eradicate the problem. This usually involved e*pel-
ling or disciplining rhe people in question, adopting a code of ethics
or reforming the federation's rules. However, FIF,{' crisis-management
methods ensured that investigations into allegations always reiained
confidential, with only the resulting decisions Ëeing divulged. This was
also the case for external audits, such as thor. ."rii.d o,ri by KPMG,
which failed to reveal any major irregularities in FIF,{s accounts for
2007--2010.
Reforms introduced by FIFA in response to its critics' allegations
include creating an Ethics committee and code of Ethics -(2004,
revised in 2006, 2009 and 2012) and setting up an independenr gov-
ernance commiftee (2011), which was ro sreer the "FIFA boar back
into. clear, ffansparent weters", as Blatter had promised to do dur-ing his presidendal election campaign. FIFA adopted many of the
12 Sepp Blatter: Wielding Power Through F|FA 325
recommendadons made by the committee's chairman," Mark pieth, a
Swiss university professor and expert in governance, including dividing
the Ethics Committee into investigarory and adjudicatory chamberg
strengthening the Audit and Compliance Committee, introducing a
code of conduct, appointing rhree women to the Executive Committee
(one voting member and two observers) and attributing one \7orld Cup
at a time. These reforms helped improve FIFAs image but they did not
address the issues of age limits and terms of office for the federationt
president, conflicts of interest âmong FIFAs members and execurives,
or the federation's clannish and nepotistic culrure (one of Blatter's neph-
ews heads Infront, the company responsible for managing FIFAs TV
rights). In fact, there is no incentive for the 34 people who run FIFA
(24 members of the Executive Committee and 10 directors) to change
a system that provides them with very lucrative "indemniries" (a total
of US$36.3 million in in 2014"i). Nor was there any pressure for
change from FIFAs confederations and member-associations, given that
the federation's revenues are conrinuing to grow rapidly (FIFA earned
US$5.7 billion berween 2011 and 2014, mostly from \?brld Cup tele-
vision rights, which have increased 2O-fold since 1998, and sponsorship
contracts). This income allowed FIFA to redistribute over US$l billion
to its member-associations, ostensibly to finance development projects,
although some of these funds appear to end up in the pockets of indi-
viduals who, in return, provide "packets of votes" for the president.
FIFA also benefimed from the benevolence of outside authorities,
including political, judicial and sporting institutions, as is shown by the
way the bankruptcy of ISL was handled by the Swiss courts. Although
an investigation by Swiss magistrares inro ISLs operations following
the company's bankruptcy showed that ISL had paid out CHFi60
million in bribes between 1989 and 2001, the case file was not mâde
public until 20I2.'ii Furthermore, according to independent sport's
ethics watchdog PlaytheGame, Joao Havelange and his son-inJaw,
Ricardo Teixeira, who was both president of the Brazilian Football
Confederation (CBF) and a member of FIFAs Executive Committee,
had received CHF41 million (US$432 million), but Swiss magistrares
refused to prosecute. Following the publication of these allegations,
Teixeira left FIFA for "medical reasons" and a year later, in July 2013,
t1r,
Havelange stepped down as honorary president of FIFA. Neverrheless,
FIFAT new Ethics Committee cleared Blatter of any wrongdoing:
"President Blatter's condua coald not be classifed in any way as rnisconduct
with regard to any ethics rules... ... (even if it) may haue been clumyr".
This collusion berween FIFA and the Swiss authorities is the result
of a combination of legal and financial considerations rhat have helped
create a vast nerwork of inter-institutional relations. Legally, swiss pros-
ecutors ere not obliged ro prosecute cases of corruprion in the private
sector unless one of the parties files a complaint. Moreover, private cor-
ruption only became illegal in Switzerland in 2004, when pressure from
the OECD's Financial Action Task Force and the GRECO forced the
Swiss government to declare private corruption a misdemeanour (it is
still not a felony) under the Unfair Competition Act. Until then, bribes
paid abroad by Swiss companies had been tax deductible! Even then,
the Swiss government assured international sport orgenisations that
they would not be subject ro the Unfair Competition Acr, as they are
not subject to competition. Because of this immuniry, and many other
powerful incentives (banking secrecy, tolerance of tax evasion, little reg-
ulation, low corporation tax--4.25o/o) and advantages (politicd stabil-
ity, protection of privary) , 67 international sport organisations have ser
up their headquarters in switzerland. These organisations contribute
more than CHF1 billion (US$1.05 billion) ro rh€ Swiss economy every
year. Although the legal pressure on sporr federarions in switzerland has
increased slightly, most members of parliament are happy to maintain
the status quo.
FlFAgate: How FIFA Finally Succumbed to Scandal
After surviving so many major crises over several decades, FIFA and
its president had begun to appear immune to scandal. So, why did
things change in 2015? The answer to this quesrion lies in the nature
and source of the allegations being made against FIFA. Unlike previ-
ous scandals, which had been triggered by isolated accusarions from sin-
gle sources, in 20L5 FIFA suddenly faced a barrage of accusarions from
numerous independent and often powerful sources.
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The scandal broke on 27 Mey 2015, the eve of FIFlfs 65th congress,
when the united states Deparrmenr of Justice (Do) published a
161-page indictment accusing 14 defendanm (9 FIFA offici,is, including
2 vice presidenrs, and 5 sports company executives) with 47 .o,rrrt ol
racketeering, fraud, money laundering, bribes and kickbacks amounring
to us$150 million. These charges were the result of a long investigation,
launched under the Racketeer Influenced and corrupt organizations
Act, into bribes relating to FIFAs presidential election in 2011, broad-
cæting rights, marketing contrects for competitions such as the copa
America, and sponsorship agreements. According to the indicrment, cor-
ruption within FIFA had been "endemic" for "a period of approximately
25 years". Ten other defendants, including Chuck Blazer and two of Jack
rfarner's sons, had already pleaded guilry berween July 2013 and May
2015. Faced with incontrovertible evidence that he had been involved in
racketeering, money laundering fraud and tax evasion (he had accumu-
lated us$11 million in undeclared earnings over a period of rgyears),
Blazer had agreed ro cooperare with the DoJ's investigation.
In conjunction with the publication (on the Internet) of this indict-
ment, Swiss police, acting on ân American \À/ârrent, arrested seven offi-
cials in a luxury hotel in Zurich Q{ew Yorh Times jownalists, tipped off
by Brooklyn's district amorney, were ar the scene). FIFAs head office
was searched under e warrant issued by switzerland's attorney general,
who was investigating the attribution of the 2018 and 2022 \7orld
Cups, while the US authorities searched CONCACAF's headquarters in
Miami. At the same rime, the head of the DoJ, Loretta Lynch (who had
supervised the investigarion as a federal prosecutor in Brooklyn), held
a news conference in New York alongside the heads of the FBI, James
Comey, and of the IRSt Criminal Investigation Division, Richard
'lû'eber, 
who spoke of a "'World Cup of fraud" spanning "ar leasr rwo
generations of soccer officials". Lynch stated: "the indictment alleges
corruption that is rarnpanr, systemic, and deep-rooted both abroad and
here in the United Srates" (Financial Times,28 May). The cooperation
between the Swiss and American authorities surprised *"rry .o--.rr-
tators ("Switzerland is playing an unexpected double role", 24 Heures,
28 Mar, as there wes no legal basis for ir. In fact, this acrion was part of
the wider cooperarion between the USA and switzerland that had arisen
>. Arc,onr et ar
5:26 5, Arcioni et al,
out of e series of banking scandals involving rwo Swiss banks, Swiss
UBS and Crédit Swiss, which had been prosecuted under Americat
Foreign Account Tax Compliance Act.
The DoJt operation, which \Mas unprecedented in terms of the
resources employed and its multi-level coordination, led to an imme-
diate response from FIFA. Between 27 May and 2 Jtne, FIFAS fthics
Committee imposed temporary suspensions on 14 FIFA oficials,
although FIFAs director of communications, 'W'alter de Gregorio,
repeatedly stated that Blatter \Mas not implicated. In fact, many observ-
ers, including some of Blatter's greatest critics, believed he would be
re-elected president despite the scandal. Effectively, at the end of a
Congress marked by unprecedented media coverâge and demonstretors
brandishing signs reading "Game over for Blaffer", the president was
re-elected (by 133 votes against 73 votes for Prince Ali, who conceded
after the first round), grving the impression that the "unbudgeable"
president would extricate himself once again. Switzerland's newspapers
agreed: "Despite the scandals, S.pp Blatter wins agairi' (Le Tèmps, 30
Mer, "The secrets of the unsinkable captairi' (24 Heures,30 May). More
presciendy, the English Football Association's chairman said he would be
"very surprised" if Blatter \À/ere to last more than two yeers.
In fact, too many important stakeholders were abandoning the
"unsinkable captain's" ship for Blatter to survive for long. Most Swiss
ne\Mspapers had already turned against him by 28 May: "Mr Blatter, go"
was the title of the editorial in 24 Heures; "Blaffer has lost his credi-
biliry'' was the headline in Le Matin, while Le Ti:rnps announced "The
end of impuniry" and L'Hebdo wrote of "S.pp Blatter's seven deadly
sins". In the UK, members of parliament called for a boycott of the
2022 YIorId Cup and, es a gesture of protest, England's FIFA repre-
sentative David Gill refused to serve on the Executive Committee. At
the same time, FIF,{s corporate sponsors (more than a third of its rev-
enues) began to \ /orry about the scandalt impact on their reputations
and were threatening to enect clauses allowing them to renegotiate
their contracts. Long-term critics of the FIFA system were even harsher,
with Guido Tognoni writing: 'for the lzst 40 years, since Haueknge uas
enthroned, FIFA hru had a culture of conuption. Blaner didn't start it,
but he has always tolerated conuption. h was a. wa! of staying in power"
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lL'Hebdo, 2S May 2015). Tognoni estimated Blatter's annual "salary'' to
be over US$i5 million. Newspapers outside Switzerland were just as
condemnatory with 7he Neut Yorh Times noting "the wiàespread impres-
sion of FIFA at d corrapt rogue state" (3 June) and several European
ne\Mspepers, including 7he Guardian and Sunday Times in England,
Mediapart in France, Il Fano Quotidiano in Italy and Der Spiegel in
Germany, launching new invesrigations into FIFAs operations. FIFA
\Mes even likened to a mafia organisation.
Nevertheless, some important figures continued ro support Blatter,
including Switzerland's Minister of Defence and Sports, Ueli Maurer,
who chose to sit beside Blatter at the opening of the FIFA Congress,
and Peter Gilliéron, the president of t]re swiss Football Association and
a member of UEFAs Executive Commirtee, who carefully watched his
words. M*y of FIFAs staff continued to believe in Blatter, roo, and on
3 June he was applauded when he arrived ar FIFA headquarters. The
same day, Switzerland's Council of States (the upper chamber of par-
liament) refused, by 23 vores ro 22, to follow the Federal Council's
recommendation to automatically prosecute all cases of private corrup-
tion. And some football executives felt it wes srill acceptable to pub-
licly acknowledge instances of give and take. For example, the French
Football Federation's president, who had supported Blatter's election
because France had just been awarded the 2019'Women's'World Cup,
claimed: "our reladons with FIFA are extremely good (...) I like to
return a favour when someone has given us something" (Reuters, 28
May 2015).
Events took another dramatic turn four days after Blatter's re-elecdon
as FIFA president, when he announced: "I have decided to lay down my
mandate at an extreordinary elecdve congress ". This decision was tâken
after an article in The Neut Yorh Times accused Jérôme Valcke, FIFAs
secretery general and Blatter's right-hand man, of making a payment of
US$10 million to CONCACAF in 2008 es a "commission" in exchange
for votes to award the 2010 \forld Cup to South Africa. Blatter's fall
\{/as now complete. As many political leaders around the world, espe-
cially in Europe, also began denouncing Blatter switzerland's politicians
began to worry about the effect on the country's image ("switzerland
fears for its image", Le Matin, 4 June).In contrast, Russia's president,
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vladimir Putin gave Blatter his official supporr against "yer anorher fla-
grant arrempt lby the unired states] to extend its jurisdiction to other
states" (The New Yorh Times,29 May). As usual, these varying govern-
ment positions reflecred each country's geopolitical interests, as sporr
had become an importanr vecror of soft power."iii
FiFAs increasing vulnerability encouraged other, previously reluctant
critics to speak out and the crisis rapidly achieved a dimension never
before seen ar FIFA or in the world of sport: "Ir is a shock, the sur-
prise we no longer expected to happen, we had gor so used to seeing
sepp Blatter weather every srorm"; "The extenr of the abuses exposed
in recent days is such that other continenrs, orher federations could be
affected" (Le Temps,3 June). The term FIFAgate, first used as a Twitter
hashtag on 27 May and quickly picked up by the media, neatly encap-
sulates this transformative evenr. The exrent of the rurnaround in FIFAs
fortunes gave confidence ro other bodies and regulators who had once
hesitated to investigate corruption in sport. For example, after years of
prevarication, Brazilian senators set up a parliamentary commission of
enquiry into the cBE and a prosecuror, who had considered reixeira
"too big a fish for me", decided to prosecute him for money laundering
and fraud. According to Brazilian police, his bank accounrs had been
swollen by "unusual" paymenrs totalling us$160 million berween 2009
and 2012, when Teixeira wâs president of the 20 14 \forld cup organis-
ing committee.
Blatter's decision to stand down while the scandal was still on-going
led to great uncertainty as to who would succeed him as FIFA presi
dent. UEFAs president, Michel Platini, was the initial favourite, pardy
due to the fact that he was one of the first senior football execurives
to abandon Blatter. Blatter's revenge was to draw a parallel berween
Platini's decision ro suppoft Qgtar's bid for the \forld ôup and his sup-
posedly close links to Qatar's royal family (French pr"rid.rrt Nicolas
sarkozy had invited Platini to a dinner that was also atiended by eatar's
crown prince Al-Thani and a representarive of the eatari owners of
PSG football club). However, the most damaging revelations came from
an investigation by Switzerland's attorney general into Blattert deal,
ings with the caribbean Football L,Inion, which uncoyered evidence
of a supposedly "disloyal paymenr" of €1.83 million (usg2.2 million)
from Blatter to Platini. France's media immediately withdrew their sup-port for Platini, who was becoming increasingly isolated in the foot-
ball world. switzerland's criminal inirestigation into Blatter,s affairs alsoled FIF,{' largest American sponsors (èoca-cora, McDonald's, visa,
Budweiser) to demand Blatter's immediate resignation on 2 october
2015. six days later, on B october, pratini, Blatt"r and valcke weregiven 90-day suspensions by FIFlfs Ethics committee, which also
announced a six-year suspension and CHF100,000 (US$105,000) fine
against-another potential presidential candidate, former FIFA vice presi-
dent.chung Mong-oon. Although platini registered for FIFAs presiden-
tial election, his chances *.r. firrth.r weakened when uEFAs Ër..,'tirr.
committee "disavowed" him in favour of its secret aty general, Gianni
Infantino. In the end, Blatter's and platini's carers'in" football were
brought to an end on the same day, 21 Decemb er 2075, when FIFA'
Ethics committee imposed eight-year suspensions and healy fines on
borh men for "conflict of interests,,'and ,disloyal 
-"rrug.-.rrr1.As a result, the way was clear for infantino to be .L.t.d FIFAs newpresident at the extraordinary congr€ss held on 26 February 2016. This
congress also approved severd reforms to FIFAs go,r.rrrrrr.", includ-
ing separating political and managerial powers, reàucing the number
of committees from 26 to g,limiting the president', t.ri, of office tol2 years, requiring individuals to disclose ih.i, ,"r.r,rnerarion, increas-
ing the role of women within FIFA and imposing a requiremenr ro
':?efi human rights. Some reforms, such as the ,!quir.à.rt ro pro_
vide independent annual audits and creare indepenàent adjudicaiory
bodies to ensure the separation of powers, arso 
"ppty ,o FIFA' member-associations and confederations. Most of these measures were proposed
by a reform commirtee that had been set up in Augus t 2015 along simi_
lar lines to the commirree ser up by the loc r: yJars earlier, and it was
widely felt that the solutions inmoduced by the Ioc could provide a
model for overcoming the FIFAgate crisis.
* 
Despite these reforms, the crisis at FIFA continued. rn May 2016,
FIFAs congress approved Infantino's proposal to give the Eiecutive
committee the power to sack the heaàs of th. EthIcs and Audit and
compliance commimees. This decision immediately red to the resigna-
tion of the Audit and compliance committeet chairman, Domenico
Scala, who had earlier stated that Russia and Qatar would possibly
no longer be eligible to host the FIFA .World Cup in 2018 and 2022
if proof of bribery was found. Furthermore, FIFlfs new execurives,
appointed to replace the 11 members who are facing prosecurion, heve
been unable to conrain a never-ending series of scandals, including
suspicious paymenrs to Blatter and two other top officials amounting
to US$80 million, conrroversy oyer rhe new presidentt salary and the
appointment of the new secrerery general, and accusations by Blatter
that the draws for major competitions were rigged.
Conclusion
Sepp Blatter's four decades as a senior execurive and then president
of FIFA left an enduring legacy for football, as rhe way in which he
implemented and expanded the vision he shared with his predeces-
sor, Joao Havelange, revolutionised FIFAs manegement and finances.
Nevertheless, his inabiliry or unwillingness to introduce the reforms
needed to stamp out the culture of corruption thar permeated FIFAs
dealings, especially those involving its continental confederations.
Despite his successes, rhe corrupt practices and clannish power sys-
tem thât permeated the highest levels of FIFAs manâgement eventually
led to the collapse of the sysrem he had instigated. In fact, the impact of
FIFAgate was so great it shook the whole world of international sport.
The reforms introduced by FIFA in the wake of FIFAgate incorpo-
râte the main principles of good governance, bur FIFA needs to main-
tain this improvement into the future. Similarly, FIFAgate morivar€d
the Olympic sport federations, via their umbrella organisation, rhe
Association of Summer Olympic International Federations (ASOIF), ro
take joint âction to improve their governance. As a resuk, all Olympic
federations musr now follow five principles-transparency, integriry
democracy, sport developmenr and solidariry and control mecha-
nisms-and measure their success in doing so. Time will tell whether this
process will result in real change and have a positive impact on rhe gov-
ernance of international, continental and nadonal sport federations.
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lvhen Blatter first arrived ar FIFA, the federation had an almost
entirely amareur mânagemenr sysrem. Today, FIFA is run as a profes-
sional corporarion with all the financial mechanisms this impiies. A
similar approach ro managemenr was subsequently adopted by the
continental confederations, which are now run on the same lines as
FIFA or, more accurately, as UEFA, which is financially and sffucrur-
ally almost FIF,{' equal. Even though the other confederations still have
huge potential for growrh, they have nor yer achieved the same degree
of autonomy from FIFA as UEFA has.
Blattert financial legacy is even more specracular than his managerial
legacy. During the four-year period .o.,r.rirrg his debut at FIFA et74-
1977), the federation earned a total of us$5.6 million. By 20rr-2014,
this sum had increased ro over US$3.8 billion, mosdy d,r. to revenlres
from television rights. This massive increase allowed FIFA to plan for
the future by putting some of its earnings into a reserve fund tÀat con-
tained almost uS$1.5 billion by the end of z0rz. As FIFA continues ro
develop nevr'' âreas of football, such as woment football, new markets,
especially China and Russia, and new merchandising products, it is
difficult ro see these revenues falling. In addition, the ied-eration is cur-
rently examining the potential of new media, especially mobile media,
for maintaining and expanding footballt audience.
Notes
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